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This collection of articles treats topics extending from the algebra of logic 
tradition in the late 19th century to certain post-1970 developments in logic. There 
is no unifying theme to the collection. Some of the articles are themselves the 
raw material of history, being accounts by participant-observers. This is particu- 
larly true of the last three: Jonathan Seldin's "In Memoriam: Haskell Brooks 
Curry" and Dirk Siefkes's "The Work of J. Richard Bfichi" are reviews of work 
and reminiscences by a student/colleague and a colleague, respectively, of those 
logicians, while Kleene's "The Writing of Introduction to Metamathematics" is 
accurately described by its title. The latter adds to a number of reminiscence 
articles by Kleene. (One which is not mentioned in this article is [6].) 
While these three articles are straightforward narratives of events with which 
the authors were for the most part personally acquainted, two other articles by 
participant-observers have more ambitious interpretative goals. Carl Smorynski's 
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"The Development ofSelf-Reference: L6b's Theorem" seeks to answer the ques- 
tion of why there was a florid mathematical development of recursion theory from 
the 1930s onward; he characterizes this as involving a functorial sort of self- 
reference, while there was no such development of the self-referential notions in 
G6del's incompleteness theorems until the much later development ofprovability 
logics starting in the 1950s but burgeoning in the 1970s and 1980s. The article 
attempts to trace "paradigm shifts" among researchers from an initial, pre-1970 
period when research involving provability predicates was concerned with philo- 
sophical problems associated with paradoxes and specific construction methods, 
to the current context in which the treatment is more abstract and based on fixed- 
point results for the provability predicates. Smorynski finds the ultimate origin of 
the current approach in LSb's presentation of his theorem in 1954, but traces and 
puzzles over the tortuous path of development to current general results. In the 
end, there is no neat characterization f what the "paradigm shift" might be, but 
there is a fascinating presentation of intellectual history, along with responsible 
historical speculation on the motivating factors in that development. 
A different sort of participant-observer article is that by Hao Wang on "G6del's 
and Some Other Examples of Problem Transmutation." He seeks to trace the 
process by which a researcher may set out to tackle one problem and, in the 
course of the work, develop methods and issues that result in the solution of a 
rather different problem. Wang traces, for the most part, the problem situation 
of the Hilbert Program about 1928 and says that G6del's initial efforts in relation 
to that program were to prove the consistency of analysis relative to number 
theory. He bases this on his own discussions with G6del. He goes on to trace 
rather sketchily the development of G6del's ideas from that point. The last two 
pages of the paper trace in an even more sketchy way the series of events that 
led from his own attempts to program a version of a Turing machine on an 
electronic omputer to considerations about the decidability of various sets of 
first-order sentences to a set of combinatorial problems formulated in terms of 
dominoes or "Wang tiles" to subsequent work by Stephen Cook on computational 
complexity. Wang's presentation relies on a quick overview and short references 
to results. It may well be suggestive to those who are specialists, but will provide 
no guidance to those not already initiated in the problems and results discussed 
here. 
One of the longer pieces in the collection is Wire Ruitenberg's "The Unintended 
Interpretations of Intuitionistic Logic." A dense survey of the roughly sixty years 
since Heyting presented an axiomatization of intuitionistic logic, the article covers 
all of the major formula translation schemes for comparing provability of intuition- 
istic to classical formulae. It goes into detail on some of them, notably those of 
G6del. It also considers various interpretations, including Tarski's and Stone's 
interpretations in topological spaces, Kleene's realizability interpretations, Kripke 
models, and interpretations using topoi. The author goes into greatest detail in 
discussing the last two. In particular, he finds in topos theory concepts which 
unify many of the interpretations suggested in earlier work. Only at the end is 
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there a discussion of what is the intended interpretation of intuitionistic logic. The 
author takes this to be Heyting's proof interpretation as developed by Kreisel, in 
which the true sentences are those having a proof of a certain type. This article 
provides a good compact survey of the topic. The author describes a number of 
interpretations and translations in detail; nevertheless, the descriptions will only 
be of use to those already familiar with the material. 
A number of articles are by authors avowedly writing as historians. The paper 
by Judy Green, "The Problem of Elimination in the Algebra of Logic," traces 
some aspects of its title subject. In his Mathematical Analysis of Logic [2], Boole 
saw an analogy with the way in which the middle term of a syllogism is "elimi- 
nated" in the conclusion to the algebraic process by which, in a system of two 
equations, it may be possible to solve one for a variable, substitute the result in 
the other, and derive a new equation in which that variable no longer appears. In 
Laws of Thought [3], Boole claimed to give a general method for applying this 
idea to any equations in his system in order to derive their consequences. Boole's 
suggestions were unsuccessful and could not handle syllogisms involving particular 
premises. Green sketches the history of attempts by Schr6der, Christine Ladd- 
Franklin, Oscar H. Mitchell, and others to produce a general method of elimina- 
tion. One apparent goal of this survey is to situate Ladd-Franklin's work as making 
a significant contribution to this general project. Although a case can be made for 
this, it would be better put if the underlying logical issues were more thoroughly 
explained. Certainly, Ladd-Franklin's unique notation could have been explained 
instead of reproduced with no comment. Finally, the article would better serve 
the reader if it acknowledged that the "method of elimination" was a misguided 
procedure which proved a false track for workers in the algebra of logic tradition. 
The article "Peirce and the Law of Distribution" by Nathan Houser addresses 
an issue in C.S. Peirce's article [8] "On the Algebra of Logic" published in the 
American Journal of Mathematics. Like many writers, the author takes Peirce 
to be presenting there defining formulas for the structures later called lattices. 
From these defining formulas Peirce said that a distribution law of multiplication 
over addition (meet over join) can be deduced. Schr6der and others gave counterin- 
terpretations showing that Peirce's distribution law does not follow from his stated 
formulas. 
In his article of 1880, Peirce stated that he had a proof of the distribution law 
that was "too tedious to give." When Schr6der subsequently inquired about this 
proof, Peirce could not find or reconstruct i . Finally, in response to an inquiry 
in 1903 by E. V. Huntington, who was working on his own treatment of Boolean 
algebra [5], Peirce produced the requisite proof. Huntington used the proof in 
preparing his own article, and the original is reproduced in the notes to the present 
article. An examination of Peirce's proof reveals that his 1880 formulation was 
inexact; what he was actually discussing was Boolean lattices, as might be expected 
of someone working in the algebra of logic tradition. Despite this history, Garrett 
Birkhoff could see fit to write in an "Historical Note" to his Lattice Theory [1, 
133], "It is curious that C.S. Peirce should have thought hat every lattice was 
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distributive." Unfortunately, this article is too ready to accept such an anachronis- 
tic view of the matter. The centerpiece of the author's analysis is his own "recon- 
struction" in a natural deduction format of a Peircean proof of distribution based 
on assumptions that can plausibly be attributed to the Peirce of 1880. While this 
is of some interpretative interest, it is not clear what large purpose it serves, since 
we have Peirce's own proof. 
A more historically useful contribution of this article is in reference to those 
who have wondered if the proof Pierce gave to Huntington might have been a 
later reconstruction by Peirce. Houser points to a manuscript (MS 575 in [9]) as 
an early version of the 1880 article. This manuscript contains an abbreviated proof 
of the distribution law. It is, however, distinct from the proof given to Huntington. 
Houser's work with MS 575 significantly strengthens the case that Peirce did 
have a proof (of some sort) for the law of distribution (on Boolean lattices) 
in 1880. 
A short article by Daniel O'Leary, entitled "Principia Mathematica nd the 
Development of Automated Theorem Proving," is a comparison of the early use 
of theorems from Principia Mathematica [11] as test material for two contrasting 
styles of automated theorem proving. The heuristic approach exemplified in the 
Logic Theorist program of Newell, Shaw, and Simon [7] is contrasted with the 
algorithmic or logic method used by H. Wang [10]. Brief descriptions and examples 
of the contrasting techniques are given. The Logic Theorist has the advantage of 
hewing closely to the explicit rules of inference of Principia. But the article fails 
to mention the much greater speed of the Wang approach over the Logic Theorist 
and, even more importantly, that it produces proofs of all propositional nd quanti- 
ficational theorems of Principia, whereas the Logic Theorist could prove only 38 
of the propositional theorems in the work. The citation given in the article for 
Newell, Shaw, and Simon [7] contains a number of errors; a correct one is given 
in the references for this review. 
The article by William Aspray, "Oswald Veblen and the Origins of Mathematical 
Logic at Princeton," is an example of the social history of mathematics. The 
article is based on a careful study of the written record and interviews with 
participants urviving in the 1980s. The result is much more than a survey of the 
career of the prominent American geometer/topologist, Oswald Veblen. We see 
here that it was specific, conscious work by first H.B. Fine and later Veblen that 
led to Princeton's position from the 1930s on as one of the world centers of 
mathematics. This work produced an institutional context of such factors as build- 
ings and grant money, and eventually the creation of the Institute for Advanced 
Study, in which Veblen played a pivotal role. More importantly for the theme, it 
was Veblen's conviction of the importance of logic (which he derived in part from 
his teacher, E.H. Moore, in Chicago) that led him to serve as a patron for the 
career of Alonzo Church at Princeton and to work to bring such figures as GOdel 
and Turing to Princeton. Aspray's paper does an admirable job of making clear 
why J.B. Rosser was able to quip that in the 1930s "four-fifths of American logic 
was at Princeton" (p. 61). 
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There are two papers by Irving Anellis. "The First Russell Paradox" follows 
the established view that Russell discovered his paradox in studying Cantor's 
proof of Cantor's Theorem, namely, that the power set of a set is of higher 
cardinality than the original set. Russell was concerned with this proof because 
he, rightly, concluded that it showed that there is no greatest cardinal number 
and no universe set containing all sets. This conflicted with Russell's commitment 
to defining sets as the extensions of propositional functions, combined with his 
inability to determine why "x is a thing" is not a propositional function. 
This article proposes to push Russell's first awareness of his paradox back in 
time from the standardly accepted June or January of 1901. The author finds 
evidence in a letter from Russell to Couturat of 8 December, 1900. The passage 
quoted in this article does not, however, say anything at all about paradoxes, nor 
is this mentioned elsewhere in the letter. The quoted passage simply criticizes 
Cantor's proof of Cantor's Theorem. 
This article would have benefited from attention to what has been described by 
J. Corcoran [4] as the "participant-relative" nature of paradoxes. That is to say, 
one person's proof by contradiction is another person's paradox. Thus, consulting 
the original papers shows that what was described subsequently by Russell (and 
others following him) as "Cantor's paradox" was presented as a simple proof by 
contradiction to show that there is no greatest cardinal. This was only paradoxical 
to someone like Russell who was committed on independent grounds to the position 
that every propositional function defines a set. 
The other paper by Anellis, entitled "The Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem, Theo- 
ries of Quantification, and Proof Theory," addresses the interrelations in history 
of these topics. A simplified form of the basic thesis of the paper might be that 
consideration of the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem led to Herbrand's work and 
that it was the work of Herbrand, and not of G6del, which was central to later 
developments in what the author calls "quantification theory." The author displays 
a vast amount of learning in the article, but it is not effectively deployed to clarify 
the thesis or to argue for it. 
One can, nevertheless, be sympathetic with the apparent intent of the article 
to introduce some complexity into the oversimplified history of mathematical logic 
as running from Frege to Whitehead and Russell to Hilbert to GOdel to the present 
day. A more successful historical treatment of some of that complexity is the 
article by John Dawson on "The Reception of G6del's Incompleteness Theorem." 
The author draws on his extensive acquaintance with the G6del papers to give a 
detailed analysis of G6del's interactions with figures such as Carnap, Bernays, 
and Zermelo concerning his incompleteness results of 1931. Although many, such 
as Carnap and Bernays, eventually came to understand and accept he general 
significance of GOdel's results, they had some difficulty understanding his methods. 
What seems to have caused the most difficulty, even for knowledgeable r aders 
of G6del's paper, was recognizing the significance of working with a specific 
recursively defined formal system, as opposed to the general notion of a formal 
system. For some of G6del's correspondents, such as Finsler, this recognition 
never came. 
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The author notes continued misunderstanding among otherwise informed non- 
logicians. Besides the notorious example of Wittgenstein's confusion about 
Grdel's incompleteness results, he cites Garrett Birkhoff writing as late as 1948 
in comments that betray a thorough miscomprehension of the nature of Grdel's 
undecidable sentence. This article fulfills the task of any history, which is to take 
us back in time to see the issues and difficulties of a situation through the eyes 
of the participants. 
The collection as a whole is representative of the diversity of work that is being 
done in the history of modern logic. No historian will find every article of interest, 
but many will find some article of interest. 
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